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1 Introduction 
Although it is no secret that economists work with a diverse set of models, this has rarely 
been brought up in methodological debates concerning the explanatory import of theoretical 
models in economics. Recently, however, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik (2015) 
emphasized the importance of having a diversity of models. In Economics Rules, Rodrik argues 
that what makes economics powerful despite the limitations of each and every model is its 
diversity of models. ‘It is a model, not the model!’ is the motto of the book. This motto 
suggests that no model can explain everything. Rather, each model is contingent—that is, it 
depends “on the specific postulated conditions” (2015, p. 25)—and has limited explanatory 
power. Rodrik suggests that the diversity of models improves the explanatory capacities of 
economics, but he does not fully explain how. The purpose of the present paper is to offer 
a clearer picture of how models relate to explanations in economics, and to suggest that the 
diversity of models is a means to better explanations. In this paper, I am mainly interested in 
how a diversity of models contributes to explanations of particular economic facts or events.  
How do models relate to explanations, and how does diversity contribute to an explanation? 
There are two possible ways to interpret Rodrik’s account. The first interpretation is that 
diversity implies that economists have a rich set of models that could apply to different 
contexts. Explanation requires finding the right model for the particular explanatory task, hence 
the particular context. Thus, explanation starts from a set of diverse models, proceeds with 
a model selection process, and ends with the “right” selected model providing an 
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explanation. In this reading, diversity of models is valuable mainly because it increases 
economists’ chances of finding the right explanatory model. 
The second reading of Rodrik is that explanation requires finding and utilizing the right set of 
models for the explanatory task at hand. The resources of multiple models are utilized in an 
explanation. Models help economists in assembling and developing possible answers for a 
given explanation-seeking question, and also in checking the validity of these explanations. 
This reading suggests that the relation between models and explanations is much more 
complicated than the first reading suggests. Moreover, if multiple models enter into an 
explanation, this means that the explanatory task is much more complex than the first 
interpretation suggests. If the phenomenon is the result of multiple causal factors and if there 
is no single model that can capture all these factors, then progress might be slow and a 
conclusive explanation may not emerge in the end. In sum, this interpretation implies that 
the contribution of the diversity of models to the explanatory capacities of economics goes 
beyond increasing the probability of finding the right model. 
In the present paper, I am primarily interested in providing a descriptive account of how 
models are utilized in explanations in economics in practice. I argue that the second 
interpretation of Rodrik’s account is more in line with the practice, and amend his account 
to explicate the link between models and explanation. I also highlight the different ways in 
which having a diversity of models could contribute to explanations. For example, many 
economic explanations utilize a diverse set of models that helps in specifying and measuring 
the explanandum (the thing to be explained), identifying possible explanatory factors that may 
account for the explanandum, and assessing the plausibility of possible explanations. My 
portrayal of the practice relies on an account of models that considers models as tools for 
how-possibly reasoning. Models help us ask and answer a series of what-if questions about 
the phenomena in question. This helps in determining the possible explanatory factors that 
could enter into an explanation and, for a given explanatory task, in populating a range of 
possible causal scenarios, or possible explanations. Providing a correct explanation requires 
determining the actual causes of the fact to be explained, and uncovering the actual causal 
story or structural dependencies based on the available menu of possible explanations 
(Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014). Portraying models as tools for how-possibly reasoning helps 
us see how having a diversity of models could improve the explanatory capacities of 
economics and increase the ability of economists to provide better explanations. This is why 
I suggest that diversity is a means to better explanations. Nevertheless, relying on a large set 
of unrealistic models also poses a number of interesting challenges. Obviously, one cannot 
discuss these challenges unless one acknowledges that economists work with a diverse set of 
models and that economic explanations often utilize multiple models. The present paper, 
then, should be considered as taking this first step. For this reason—and also because of 
space constraints—I do not discuss these challenges except briefly in the conclusion.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: The second section surveys Rodrik’s account of models 
and explanation in economics. In the third section, I argue that Rodrik’s account implies that 
economists utilize multiple models in their explanations. The fourth section maps Rodrik’s 
terminology onto my own terminology and suggests that models should be considered as 
tools for how-possibly reasoning. In the fifth section, I explain the different roles that models 
play in the process of explaining particular facts or events (i.e., in providing singular 
explanations). In the sixth section, I discuss how a diverse set of models could help in 
developing better explanations in economics. The seventh section concludes the paper.  
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2 Rodrik on models and explanation 
Rodrik (2015) thinks that much of the criticism of economics is based on misunderstandings 
of economic models and how economists use them in their explanations or in policy-making. 
Before Rodrik, a number of economists attempted to provide us with accounts of economic 
models that were supposed to obviate the misunderstandings concerning what economists 
actually do (e.g., see Gibbard and Varian, 1978; Sugden, 2000, 2009, 2011, 2013; Gilboa et 
al., 2014). What makes Rodrik’s contribution different is his double emphasis on the diversity 
and limitations of theoretical models in economics. He accepts that each model has limited 
explanatory power, but he also argues that the explanatory capacity of economics as a whole 
is not limited by the limitations of individual models, because the diversity of models 
increases its explanatory power. But how does a diverse set of models—each of which has 
limited explanatory ability—enhance the explanatory capacities of economics? Let us have a 
closer look at Rodrik’s account of economic models. 
First, contrary to the instrumentalist accounts that were inspired by Friedman (1953), Rodrik 
argues that the realisticness of some assumptions matters: “Unrealistic assumptions are OK; 
unrealistic critical assumptions are not OK” (2015, p. 213). Rodrik emphasizes the 
importance of critical assumptions throughout the book (2015, pp. 18, 27, 29, 94), arguing 
that “what matters to the empirical relevance of a model is the realism of its critical 
assumptions” (2015, p. 94). But what is a critical assumption? Here is Rodrik’s definition: 
[…] an assumption is critical if its modification in an arguably more 
realistic direction would produce a substantive difference in the 
conclusion produced by the model. (2015, p. 27) 
Many assumptions may be harmless in this sense. Others can be critical 
for some types of questions the model answers but not for others. (2015, 
p. 94) 
Rodrik’s definition is not self-explanatory. Let us temporarily define a critical assumption as 
an assumption concerning an important property of the phenomenon at stake given the 
explanatory or policy task.  For example, whether firms are assumed to have market power 
or not may be a critical assumption given a policy task intended to advise a government on 
the effects of a price cap. It is difficult to predetermine all critical assumptions of a model 
(because they are relative to the task at hand), but the important point here is that Rodrik 
suggests that the applicability of a model depends on its ability to capture an important 
property of the phenomenon, given the task. With this preliminary definition, we can move 
on, but note that how critical assumptions are conceived is relevant to how we understand 
the contribution of diversity to the explanatory capacities of economics. I discuss this point 
in Section 3.  
Second, the function of the assumptions of a model is to isolate causal mechanisms and 
relevant dependencies (Mäki, 1992, 2011; Rodrik, 2015, pp. 25, 43, 86, 114, 213); or put 
differently, models allow economists to study the effect of certain factors in isolation from 
the influence of others. Rodrik argues that models function like experiments in this sense. 
They are like thought experiments (Mäki, 1992, 2005; Morgan, 2002; Rodrik, 2015, pp. 24, 
114). However, models do not aim to account for all potential causal mechanisms at the same 
time. Rather, models “isolate and identify causal mechanisms, one at a time” (Rodrik, 2015, 
p. 25).  
Third, for this reason, each model can only provide a partial account of the phenomenon 
concerned (on this, also see Aydinonat, 2008). “Each economic model is like a partial map 
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that illuminates a fragment of the terrain” (2015, p. 8). Especially, “they leave us short of a 
full explanation of real-world phenomena when many causes might be simultaneously 
operating” (Rodrik, 2015, p. 114). Every model focuses on different aspects of the real world, 
and highlights different dependencies and background conditions.  
Fourth, Rodrik argues that “the diversity of models in economics is the necessary counterpart 
to the flexibility of the social world. Different social settings require different models” (2015, 
p. 5). It is because of the limitations of models and the complexity of the social world that 
we need multiple models to navigate our way into the real world.  
Finally, as a consequence and as a matter of fact, economists develop and work with a diverse 
set of models (on this, also see Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014). There are models of the same 
type of phenomena that focus on different aspects, mechanisms, background conditions, 
etc., and models of different types of phenomena. In short, as Rodrik argues, “economics 
encompasses a large and evolving variety of frameworks, with different interpretations of 
how the world works and diverse implications for public policy” (2015, p. ix). 
So how does diversity improve the explanatory capacities of economics? A preliminary answer 
emerges from this introduction to Rodrik’s account: to navigate through the complex social 
world, one needs many models, each of which is applicable to different contexts. That is, 
explaining various aspects of the real world requires using various models. It is for this reason 
that diversity enhances the explanatory capacities of economics.  
3 Diversity and explanation 
Rodrik considers models as investigative tools that help us understand and explain the real 
world. He also sees models as policy-making tools. Throughout the book, Rodrik vacillates 
between these two perspectives, which give us slightly different views on how diversity 
contributes to economics. Consequently, there are two possible ways to interpret Rodrik on 
how models contribute to explanations. 
The first interpretation is as follows: a diversity of models enriches the model pool and 
increases the probability of finding the right model for the explanatory task. That is, in the end, 
one “right” model will be selected for the explanatory task, and it will do the explanatory 
work. Rodrik’s discussion of model selection in particular supports this reading.  
The chapter on model selection starts with the example of a car engine failure (Rodrik, 2015, 
pp. 85–86). Rodrik asks the reader how she would go about locating the problem. He argues 
that although all parts of the engine are causally and structurally relevant to the correct 
operation of the car, starting with a study of a full-size replica model of the complete working 
engine and ripping the car apart are not good strategies. Rather, he suggests, one should start 
with a set of models of engine failure that highlight possible engine problems that one might 
encounter, and search for evidence suggesting which of these problems is more likely to be 
the actual problem. He argues that in this process “what helps is knowing what to focus on” 
and models guide us in choosing what might help. Because each model isolates a different 
mechanism, each will point to a different mechanism as a cause of the problem. But, Rodrik 
argues, “the dominant mechanism in explaining the failure is only one of these”, and this 
leads us to the right or correct model (2015, pp. 17, 61, 85, 86). Accordingly, he argues, 
“selecting the right model to apply is key” (2015, p. 61). 
From all this, it appears that the role of a diversity of models is to increase economists’ 
chances of finding the right model for the task. Once the right model is found, it does the 
explanatory work. However, this conclusion cannot be right because Rodrik also argues that 
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social reality is complex and multiple causal mechanisms are at work more often than not. 
Because each model is limited, a single model cannot always provide us with a satisfactory 
explanation that takes into account all the relevant factors that produce the phenomenon. 
This brings us to the second reading of Rodrik’s account. 
The fourth chapter of the book, where Rodrik discusses the types of explanation-seeking 
questions that economists try to answer, supports another reading. Rodrik suggests that when 
economists answer why-questions or big timeless questions, they utilize a set of models to 
provide an explanation; that is, an explanation does not always involve selecting the “right” 
model. Economists utilize a set of models in their explanations. Explanation, then, requires 
selecting the right set. That set might, of course, contain only one model for some 
explanatory tasks, but it does not have to. 
As I have indicated above, the interpretation of what Rodrik means by critical assumptions 
is relevant to this second reading of how models relate to explanations. Recall that Rodrik’s 
definition implied that an assumption is critical if changing it produces different results. This 
could be determined by altering the model’s assumptions and checking whether the result 
holds. Philosophers call this derivational robustness analysis (Woodward, 2006; Kuorikoski, 
Lehtinen and Marchionni, 2010).1 For example, consider a textbook Hotelling location model 
(Varian, 2009). The model assumes that two profit-maximizing sellers are located in a 
bounded linear market where customers are evenly distributed, prices are given, and sellers 
compete in location. The result of the model is that sellers locate at the center of the market 
(which represents minimum product differentiation). If we change the assumption that prices 
are given and let the sellers compete both in price and location, the result of the original 
model will not obtain. Thus, following Rodrik we could argue that the assumptions 
concerning the non-existence of price competition are critical to the Hotelling model.  
If we were to follow the first reading above, this would mean that the Hotelling model would 
only be applicable to situations in which this assumption holds. However, as Rodrik also 
argues, the real world is complex, and the contexts in which this assumption holds are rare. 
Rather, there is usually some degree of price competition together with competition in 
product characteristics, such as location. To explain the amount of product differentiation, 
economists commonly use multiple models. While the Hotelling model alerts us to a 
tendency of firms to produce similar products, other models tell us that there is another 
tendency that pulls firms away from each other. For this reason, to explain the degree of 
product differentiation in a particular market one may need to utilize multiple models and 
feed these models with relevant contextual details (e.g., see Borenstein and Netz, 1999; Netz 
and Taylor, 2002). 
Moreover, robustness analysis cannot determine criticality of an assumption by itself, because 
Rodrik thinks criticality relates to applicability, being context dependent. Consider a case 
where a model’s results are very sensitive to changes in its assumptions. For example, 
Hotelling’s original model (1929) is very sensitive (not robust) to alterations in many of its 
assumptions. Changing the number of sellers from two to three, altering the shape of the 
market from a line to a circle, changing the functional form of the transportation costs, etc. 
                                                 
1  Note that what Rodrik means by diversity is not limited to the families of models produced by robustness 
analyses. A set of models implied by robustness analysis would contain models that share a common core 
mechanism and differ only slightly from the original model in other assumptions (e.g., tractability 
assumptions). However, Rodrik also talks about models that are fundamentally different from each other; 
including models that focus on different causal mechanisms.  
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changes the results of the Hotelling model (e.g., see Eaton and Lipsey, 1989). If these 
assumptions were to determine the applicability of the model, the Hotelling model would 
not be very useful. This is not the case, however. The Hotelling model alerts us to a tendency 
and it is explanatorily relevant if this tendency is found in the real world. As I have tentatively 
suggested above, the criticality of an assumption can only be judged given the explanatory 
(or, policy-relevant) task at hand. Besides, as this discussion suggests, there might be many 
models that could be relevant to a given task. 
In sum, the second reading seems to be more in line with Rodrik’s discussion of explanation 
in economics. In fact, Rodrik provides us with an example of multiple models being utilized 
in explaining the rise of inequality in the United States, which I discuss in Section 5. 
4 Answering explanation-seeking questions 
An explanation has two main components; an explanans (set of propositions that do the 
explaining) and an explanandum (the thing that is explained). Ideally, factors cited in the 
explanans should make us understand why the explanandum phenomenon exists, happened, 
came about, etc. An explanation stating that X explains Y implies that X is causally 
responsible for Y, and that if X did not happen, Y would not happen.2 Given this working 
definition, we can distinguish between two types of explanation in economics. Some 
explanations explain stylized facts, regularities or generalizations. Let us call these theoretical 
explanations.3 Economists also explain particular facts or events. Let us call these singular 
explanations.  
Rodrik (2015, pp. 113–145) distinguishes between three different kinds of questions that 
economists answer: what questions, why questions and big questions. Unfortunately, this is 
neither a good classification nor an exhaustive one. Nevertheless, let us have a closer look at 
what Rodrik has in mind. 
• What-questions. According to Rodrik, what questions are the proper domain of models 
(2015, p. 115). Economic models help us answer questions like the following: "What 
is the effect of A on X? For example: What is the effect of an increase in the level of 
the minimum wage on employment?" (2015, p. 114). How does a model answer a 
what question? Given the conditions specified by its assumptions, a model shows 
how the isolated causal mechanism produces the model’s results (2015, pp. 114–115). 
Note however, there is no guarantee that what we observe in the model (the relation 
between A and X) is a good guide to what is happening in the real world. Thus, 
additional steps are required if we want to use a model’s answer to a what-question 
in an explanation (of a real world phenomenon). As I argue shortly, a more 
appropriate characterization of the kinds of questions that models help us answer is 
that models help us with what-if questions. Moving from what-if questions (or 
Rodrik’s what-questions) to why-questions is not a simple matter. 
                                                 
2  For reasons of brevity and clarity, I only discuss this causal account of explanation in this paper. Nevertheless, 
the general argument is applicable to non-causal explanations as well.  
3  For the causal account of explanation I use here, see Woodward (2003). For the basics of explanation, see 
Ruben (2012). There is no general agreed-upon definition of theoretical explanations. The distinction I make 
here is based on the explanandum of singular and theoretical explanations. If the explanandum is a particular 
fact or event, I consider it as a singular explanation. If the explanandum is some sort of generalization or a 
regularity, I define it as a theoretical explanation. The reader could also use the term ‘generic explanations’ 
instead of ‘theoretical explanations’. The naming is not important for the purposes of this paper, but the 
distinction is.  
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• Why-questions. Rodrik considers the answers to why-questions as "explanations of an 
observed set of facts or developments". The aim of such explanations is “to shed 
light on particular historical episodes" (2015, p. 115). Thus, in our terminology 
answers to Rodrik’s why-questions are singular explanations. However, note that one 
can also ask why-questions concerning regularities and general phenomena—
answers to which would be theoretical explanations. Rodrik classifies this latter type 
of why-questions as big questions.  
• Big questions. Then there are big timeless questions, such as “what determines the 
distribution of income in a society?” and “what are the determinants of the wealth 
of nations?” In our terminology, answers to these question would be theoretical 
explanations. However, there are also big and hard to answer questions about 
particular facts. For example, consider a favorite question of economists: why did the 
West get rich, but not the rest? An answer to this question would constitute a singular 
explanation and it is different from questions like “what is value?”, “what are the 
determinants of national wealth?”, or “why do prices increase when there is an 
increase in demand?”  
Economists provide us with singular explanations (small and big) and theoretical 
explanations. The focus of this paper is on how answers to Rodrik’s ‘what questions’ relate 
to singular explanations in economics. How do we move from models to singular 
explanations?  
An important step for seeing how models are used in explanations is to understand that 
economic models help us answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions (Woodward, 
1984, 2003, Morgan, 1999, 2001, 2002; Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014).4 What if there is an 
increase in an individual’s budget? What if the price of the substitute good changes? What if 
there is a supply shock? etc. That models help us answer what-if questions is well in line with 
Rodrik’s account. In fact, Rodrik himself lists a set of what-if questions when he tries to 
show how models guide our intuition concerning the effects of immigration (2015, p. 57). 
The important thing to note here that “an economic model […] is a thoroughly artificial 
construct that unfolds in our minds only” (2015, p. 23). That is, a model helps us ask and 
answer what-if questions, but these what-if questions still concern this construct, the model-
world. For this reason, models are tools for exploring possibilities; helping us see what might 
happen, what interactions are likely to be important, and so on. In Rodrik’s words, 
“economic models alert us to a variety of scenarios” (2015, p. 209) and “open our eyes to 
counterintuitive possibilities and unexpected consequences”  (2015, p. 46).  
If models are tools for how-possibly reasoning, what models provide us with can be 
considered as a list of factors (mechanisms, conditions, exogenous factors, etc.) that might 
be explanatorily relevant. Each model alerts us to a set of explanatory factors and informs us 
about the settings under which they might be relevant. A diverse set of models, then, gives 
us a menu of explanatory factors together with guidelines concerning when we are likely to 
observe them in action. Another way to put this is as follows. Models provide us with causal 
mechanism schemes that we can use in constructing our explanations. In explaining particular 
                                                 
4 This depiction of models is obviously related to the theory of explanation that considers explanations as 
answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions (Woodward, 1984, 2003). At first sight, the relation 
between models and explanation appears to be simple: models help us answer what-if questions, hence they 
help us explain. Nevertheless, as this paper illustrates, the relation between models and explanation is more 
complex than this first impression suggests. 
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facts, causal mechanism schemes are used as building blocks for causal scenarios that might 
bring about the particular fact under investigation (Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014). Hence, 
models help us produce a menu of causal scenarios, or a menu of possible explanations (cf. Rodrik, 
2015, p. 21,74, where he talks about a menu of models). The task of providing a singular 
explanation requires determining the plausibility of these causal scenarios. To provide a 
correct explanation one needs to verify that the mechanisms and factors suggested by the set 
of relevant models are actually responsible for the phenomenon of interest. The diversity of 
models provides us with “a menu to choose from,” but we also “need an empirical method 
for making that choice”, argues Rodrik (2015, p. 74). Verification plays an important role in 
moving from models to explanations in economics. 
To sum up, if we follow Rodrik’s discussion of how models help us explain, it turns out that 
the added benefit of diversity of models concerns the ability to assemble possible 
explanations using multiple models. Rodrik provides a nice example: the case of rising 
inequality in the U.S. In discussing this example, Rodrik (2015, p. 117) assesses "the relative 
contributions of different models, and show[s] how such a process generates insight even 
when it does not produce a conclusive and widely agreed theory". In what follows, I use 
Rodrik’s example to explicate the several ways in which models contribute to an explanation.  
5 How diversity contributes to explanations 
We are interested in how models are used in producing singular explanations in economics. 
Broadly, models contribute to explanations in economics in two ways. First, they provide us 
with the explanatory factors that go into the explanans. Second, they contribute to the final 
product, the explanation, by providing other services. For example, models can be used as 
benchmarks, as frameworks for thinking about possibilities, tools for measurement or 
prediction, and so on (Pielou, 1981; Wimsatt, 1987; Odenbaugh, 2005). In order to come up 
with an explanation, we often utilize some of these model services. The case of the 
explanation for rising inequality in the U.S. is a nice illustration of how models contribute to 
an explanation, and why having a diversity of models can be an asset for social scientists. 
A review of the literature on rising inequality in U.S. suggests that models help us in (i) 
identifying and describing the explanandum, and making the explanandum more precise; (ii) 
identifying the set of possible explanatory factors and explanations; (iii) verifying the 
mechanisms and implications of possible explanations, (iv) stitching the available 
explanations together; and (v) assembling the final explanation. Let me explain. 
First, models help in identifying and describing the explanandum. Often it turns out that the 
initial explanation-seeking question conceals many smaller questions. For example, increased 
inequality in the U.S. could mean many different things. We could ask a variety of questions: 
why did the incomes (or wealth) of the top 1% of the population increase relative to that of 
the 99%? Why did the incomes of skilled workers increase relative to unskilled workers? Why 
did the wage gap between workers in manufacturing increase? and so on.5 Moreover, 
answering one of these more specific questions requires formulating the explanandum more 
precisely. For example, we might be interested in inequality in wage incomes rather than 
capital incomes; or we could investigate why the relative wages of educated workers are 
increasing as a proxy for the change in the relative wages of skilled workers. And so on. 
Economists tackle an explanation-seeking question like the one about inequality by 
addressing a “smaller”, more precise and more manageable version of it. Hence answering 
                                                 
5 For a review of different aspects and measures of inequality, see Levy and Murnane (1992). 
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the original question (e.g., about inequality) often takes time and requires the input of many 
economists. Different economists focus on different but related questions and address 
different aspects of the problem. The role of the diversity of models at this stage of the 
process is helping each economist to specify their explanandum more precisely. For example, 
models in labor economics guide economists about different types of income and labor, 
determination of wages, and the supply of and demand for skilled and unskilled labor, etc. 
The literature on the U.S. income inequality shows that since 1990s economists have been 
busy identifying and describing their explanandum using multiple models (for a survey, see 
Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2008). 
The task of identifying and describing the explanandum also requires figuring out ways to 
measure what we wish to explain. Measurements in economics are shaped by economic 
models as well as statistical models. For instance, a measure of inequality must be used in 
our example. Since there are several such measures, one needs to use one that is appropriate 
for this task. Inequality between the incomes of workers and those of owners of other 
production factors can be traced using the wage share (labor share) as a measure. Using this 
measure would presume a model of the economy and a set of complicated statistical methods 
to measure GDP—which is itself a construct of economists (Coyle, 2014). Alternatively, one 
could use the Gini coefficient, a common and convenient measure for income (and wealth) 
inequality. The Gini coefficient is frequently defined using a model of the distribution of 
income or wealth; the Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905; Giorgi, 1990). In sum, models also enter 
this first stage of explanation as tools for measurement; they help us answer how-much 
questions (Boumans, 2006, 2009) and specify the explanandum in a measurable way. It is worth 
noting that difficulty of measurement and availability of data sometimes determine how the 
explanandum is formulated and what aspects of the phenomenon are considered. 
Second, models help in identifying the set of possible explanatory factors and explanations. 
Let us assume that we have identified and described the explanandum as precisely as we can. 
Let our question be the following: why did the incomes of skilled workers increase relative 
to the incomes of unskilled workers in the 1980s in the U.S.? Also, assume that we have 
decided to use the level of education as a proxy for skill. The basic supply-demand model is 
central to thinking about the possible causes of an increasing wage gap between skilled (high-
education) and unskilled (low-education) workers, and to formulating possible causal 
scenarios that could explain it. By way of helping us ask and answer what-if questions such 
as what if the relative supply of unskilled workers rises, the basic supply-demand model helps 
in exploring possibilities and locating the channels through which relative wages might 
change. This helps us to list possible causes and formulate possible causal scenarios. See, for 
example, how a labor economics textbook lists these possibilities.  
The major phenomenon we must explain is the widening gap between the 
wages of highly educated and less-educated workers, and our basic 
economic model suggests three possible causes. First, the supply of less-
educated workers might have risen faster than the supply of college 
graduates, driving down the relative wages of less-skilled workers. Second, 
the demand for more-educated workers might have increased relative to the 
demand for less-educated workers. Finally, changes in institutional forces, 
such as the minimum wage or the decline in unions, might have reduced the 
relative wages of less-educated workers. (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012, pp. 
542–543; emphasis added) 
10 
 
This textbook example is in line with the practice of economists. For example, Bound and 
Johnson (1992) follows a similar strategy in listing alternative possible explanations in their 
article entitled “Changes in the structure of wages in the 1980's: an evaluation of alternative 
explanations.”  
Although the basic supply demand model is a good starting point, it is not enough. One also 
needs to think about why supply and demand might be changing. This requires looking at 
other models. Economics has a plethora of models that could help us. For example, a 
standard textbook in labor economics (e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012) provides us with a 
model of the firm and its demand for labor, diverse models of individuals and the supply of 
labor (e.g., the labor-leisure choice model, labor-household production model), job-matching 
models (e.g., models of compensating wage differentials), models of individual investment 
in skills (e.g., the human capital investment model), models of minimum wages and union 
wage effects, etc. Beyond labor economics, there might be other relevant models, such as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, which show how other factors (such as international trade) 
might influence the relative wages of skilled workers. These models guide our thinking 
concerning factors that might explain rising inequality and help in formulating the following 
possible explanations, extensively discussed in the literature: 
(i) Globalization: Globalization might have influenced the wage gap through 
openness to trade, international competition, offshoring, foreign direct 
investments (influencing relative demand for skill), and immigration (influencing 
the relative supply of unskilled workers). 
(ii) Technological change: Skill-biased technological change, increasing skill 
requirements, and technologies that replace unskilled labor (influencing the 
relative demand for skilled workers) might have caused the wage gap. 
(iii) Institutional factors:  Institutional factors, such as policies concerning unionization, 
minimum wages, tax rates and education could potentially influence the relative 
wages of skilled workers and change the supply of skilled labor via their effect 
on college enrolments. 
The important point here is that a single model cannot help us formulate these alternative 
causal scenarios. Knowledge of a wide variety of different but related models is needed. Two 
examples will suffice. For example, the H-O model enters into the picture because it suggests 
a possible causal scenario by which the relative wages of skilled workers increase (Rodrik, 
2015, pp. 139–140). According to the model, increasing openness to trade causes the U.S. to 
export skilled-labor intensive goods and import low-skilled-labor intensive goods. 
Accordingly, the demand for skilled labor increases, and demand for low-skilled labor 
decreases in the U.S. This explains the increasing relative wages of skilled workers. However, 
the H-O model implies that in the U.S.’s trading partners, relative wages of skilled workers 
will not increase. An alternative to the H-O model is the Feenstra-Hanson (F-H) model 
(1995, 1997). Contrary to the H-O model, the F-H model shows that rising wages of skilled 
labor in both developed and less-developed countries might be consistent with capital flows 
between these countries (Feenstra and Hanson, 1995, 1997). It alerts us to the importance 
of offshoring and FDI as possible causes of the wage gap. 
Third, theoretical models help in verifying the mechanisms and implications of possible 
explanations. Note here that I am suggesting that models help in verifying possible 
explanations; it is not models that are verified, but possible explanations suggested by the set 
of available models. Rodrik talks about model selection as a process through which the 
assumptions and implications of a model are verified. Hence, it is possible to interpret him 
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as saying that models are verified. This, however, is not always the case. Consider the basic 
supply-demand model we referred to earlier. Economists do not try to verify this model in 
trying to determine the most plausible explanation. On the contrary, they take the 
implications of this model as granted and use it to verify the plausibility of the available 
possible explanations. For example, Ehrenberg and Smith (2012, pp. 542–551) ask the reader 
what if the change in the relative supply of skilled labor was the source of the income 
inequality. They use the standard supply and demand model to answer this question, since if 
there were a reduction in the relative supply of skilled workers, the relative wages of skilled 
workers would increase. However, this change would also imply that the relative quantity of 
skilled (unskilled) workers in the labor market would decrease (increase). This implication is 
taken for granted and helps them verify the plausibility of alternative explanations. They 
conclude that because the employment of unskilled workers did not increase in the U.S., the 
change in supply cannot be the dominant explanatory factor. Similarly, Levy and Murnane 
(1992, p. 1342) talk about an “Economics 1 test” in order to “test explanations” or 
“explanatory theories” (1992, p. 1341). 
A similar verification process helped economists dismiss the possible explanation suggested 
by the H-O model because its implications were not supported by data (Rodrik, 2015, p. 
140). This however did not mean that the H-O model was rejected. On the contrary, because 
the implication of the model was taken for granted, it was concluded that international trade 
could not be solely responsible for the increasing relative wages of skilled workers. However, 
an alternative, the F-H model, suggested another possible explanation. Its implications were 
consistent with these findings and with other sources of data (Feenstra and Hanson, 1995, 
1997). Thus, globalization and international trade remained relevant as possible explanations 
for income inequality in the U.S.  
These examples explain why I suggest that theoretical models help us verify explanations, 
rather than talking about a model verification process. However, it is important to note that 
the verification process often involves specifying an empirical model that could help identify 
the plausibility of alternative explanations. As such, it could depart from a basic model, such 
as the supply-demand model, and include additional variables in order to test for other 
alternative explanations. For example, because the standard model assumes that wages reflect 
the productivities of different groups of workers, it cannot account for divergences from this 
competitive norm due to institutional factors. To test for institutional factors, an additional 
variable also needs to be introduced into the empirical model (e.g., see Bound and Johnson, 
1992). Here we need not go into the details of the methodology of this verification process. 
Highlighting the fact that theoretical models play an important role in helping economists 
specify empirical models and test for alternative explanations is enough for our purposes. 
Verification of the existence of explanatory factors cited in possible causal scenarios could 
be quite straightforward for some cases. For example, a possible causal scenario that includes 
the immigration of low-skilled workers would be rejected if there were no immigration. The 
process of verification will be more complex for others because of the lack of data, difficulty 
in identification, etc. However, even if the factors cited are in existence, and hence verified, 
this does not imply that a possible causal scenario is the actual one. This is why additional 
verification of causal scenarios using the implications of relevant models is needed, as we 
have seen above.  
Verifying a possible causal scenario might also involve questioning its applicability to other 
related explananda. For example, for a while the explanation for the rising wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled labor favored by most economists appeared to be skill-based 
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technological change (SBTC). The SBCT scenario seemed to explain developments in the 
1980s well. However, it turned out that SBTC was not consistent with later trends, such as 
the stabilization of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers despite continued 
technological change, and its implications were not fully consistent with other aspects of 
wage inequality (i.e., other explananda, such as gender and race wage gaps) (for an extensive 
review, see Card and DiNardo, 2002). This cast doubt on its explanatory power. Hence, 
economists concluded that it could not be the only explanation of the increasing inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers in the 1980s. For this reason, they pursued an 
alternative to the SBCT model which assumed that technology influences wages through 
demand for skilled workers. It is possible that technological change influences wages through 
more complex channels (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012, p. 547). In fact, recent work suggests 
that technological progress might have had a polarizing effect in that the employment of 
skilled and unskilled workers increases at the expense of middle-skill workers (Autor, 2010).  
Evidence also suggested that institutional factors, such as policies concerning minimum 
wages (a decreasing real minimum wage) and unionism (declining union membership) might 
have also contributed to the wage gap (Card and DiNardo, 2002; Autor, 2014; Mishel, 
Schmitt and Shierholz, 2014; Autor, Manning and Smith, 2016).  
Finally, models help in stitching the available explanations together. Despite all the efforts, 
this process of hunting for causes and verifying implications of models leaves us with a set 
of possible explanations. No single model can fully explain the rising skill premium in the 
1980s. Recall that this was just one aspect of the rising inequality in the U.S. For its other 
aspects, economists developed other possible causal scenarios, considered more models, and 
tried to verify their explanations. The story is similar: no single model can explain other 
aspects of inequality in the U.S., let alone explain all its aspects. No single conclusive 
explanation emerges. Nevertheless, attempts to explain various aspects of inequality are not 
independent of each other. In fact, approaching the same fact from different dimensions 
help us cross check the plausibility of a set of possible scenarios with related possible 
scenarios. Extensive review articles commonly try to stitch together explanations of different 
aspects of a given fact (such as inequality in the U.S.) and expose inconsistencies between 
the available explanations (see, for example, Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2008). This process 
of stitching explanations together is also guided by available models. If the models share a 
set of principles and assumptions (e.g., profit and utility maximization) this guides the 
stitching process. As in our example, the supply and demand model helps to formulate how 
models relate to each other in explaining different aspects of the phenomenon in question 
(e.g., see Autor, 2014).  
As Rodrik argues, social reality is complex and for this reason we do not always arrive at 
complete and correct explanations. The outcome of this complex and painful process of 
identifying, describing, measuring, exploring, conjecturing, verifying, and stitching is usually 
a patchwork of the most likely causal scenarios. Of course, inequality is a complex 
phenomenon and maybe this was to be expected. But consider an apparently simpler 
explanation-seeking question: why does popcorn cost so much at movie theaters in the U.S.? 
This question turns out be a difficult one to answer. As in the case of inequality in the U.S., 
economists formulate possible explanations of high popcorn prices at theaters, and try to 
determine which one (or which combination) of these explanations is more likely be the 
correct answer. But no single completely satisfactory answer emerges (McKenzie, 2008; 
Landsburg, 2012).  
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Nevertheless, the process described above gives us better ideas about which scenarios are 
more likely and how the causal factors cited by various scenarios might have interacted. Even 
if we do not have conclusive explanations, there is progress in the sense that our explanations 
are moving in the right direction. 
6 Better explanations? 
Let us now consider how having a diversity of models could improve a singular explanation. 
A singular explanation is an answer to a specific explanation-seeking question concerning a 
particular fact or event. The question is specific in the sense that it asks why one thing 
happened rather than something else. For example, our question was why the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers increased in the 1980s rather than not increasing given 
the conditions of the U.S. economy in that period. Stated like this, the question constrains 
the amount of explanatory information needed to fully answer it. What we expect economics 
to provide us with is relevant pieces of information that would help us answer this question. 
If we were able to provide an ideal explanation,6 this explanation would cite all the relevant 
factors that are responsible for the explanandum phenomenon given the explanatory task at 
hand. Such an ideal explanation would provide a complete answer to the explanation-seeking 
question that we were trying to answer. The ideal explanation, as the name suggests, is an 
ideal. In practice, scientists (economists included) commonly fall short of providing us with 
ideal explanations. Rather, they try to get closer to the ideal explanation by way of supplying 
the bits and pieces of explanatory information needed to provide that explanation. An ideal 
explanation of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in U.S. would provide us 
with a list of factors that contribute to this inequality, inform us about how these factors 
interacted and present evidence concerning their relative contributions. Although 
economists did not provide us with everything we needed to know, they provided us with 
explanatorily relevant information about the parts of the process of this increasing inequality. 
In the previous section, we have seen that having a diversity of models played an important 
role in the process by way of helping economists provide explanatory information. It is in 
this sense that the diversity of models helps economists in getting closer to providing a correct 
and complete answer to an explanation-seeking question about a particular real-world 
economic phenomenon. 
It is certainly true that we now have a better understanding of the increasing wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled workers in the 1980s in the U.S. In Section 5, we have seen 
that “why did this gap increase?” was only one of the many questions that we could ask about 
increased inequality in the U.S. For this reason, merely answering this question is not 
sufficient for a better understanding of the inequality in the U.S., which requires the answers 
to a larger number of questions concerning the other aspects of inequality. More generally, 
our understanding of it depends on our ability to ask and answer a large set of what-if 
questions and to see the connections between these answers (Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014). 
A diversity of models is also valuable in these respects. It increases our ability to ask and 
answer a large number of interrelated what-if questions. In this sense, the diversity of models 
is also a means to a better understanding of economic phenomena. 
7 Conclusion 
Because social reality is complex, and because no single model can account for it immediately, 
providing singular explanations in economics is difficult. As in the case of inequality in the 
                                                 
6  On ‘ideal explanatory text’, see Railton (1978, 1981). 
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U.S. the process can take several decades and in the end a conclusive explanation may not 
emerge. Nevertheless, in dealing with the complexity of the real world, using multiple models 
to investigate aspects of the phenomenon in question appears to be a better strategy than 
using complex but opaque models. By way of allowing economists to tackle different aspect 
of the explanandum from multiple angles, and helping them to verify possible causal scenarios, 
diversity of models helps economists unearth the truths about their explanandum. Diversity 
of models helps us provide explanatory information about several relevant aspects of the 
phenomenon to be explained. In this sense, the diversity of models is a means to better 
explanations in economics. 
Providing singular explanations in economics is a complex process that cannot be 
summarized with a single recipe. Nevertheless, provided that there is already a set of 
established theoretical models concerning a given explanatory task, we can summarize the 
process of moving from models to singular explanations in the following steps. 
(i) Determine the set of models that are relevant for the explanatory task, 
(ii) Assemble a list of possible explanations from the menu of possible explanatory 
factors which are suggested by this set of models, 
(iii) Empirically verify which of these factors are actually causing the fact or event to 
be explained, 
(iv) If available models fail to lead to a satisfactory explanation, look for other 
relevant models, or build new models to expand the menu of possible 
explanations, and 
(v) Repeat the preceding steps until a satisfactory explanation is found.  
This list is not meant to summarize what an individual economist does or should do to 
provide an explanation. Rather, it characterizes the collective process of providing model-
based explanations. At any given time, individual economists are likely to work on different 
steps simultaneously. Moreover, if the original explanatory task turns out to be too 
complicated, it will be divided into manageable sub-tasks (i.e., a big question will be divided 
into smaller and simpler questions) and these sub-tasks will be tackled by various economists 
at various times. As models, evidence, and the answers to manageable questions accumulate, 
the ability of economists to answer to larger and more difficult questions could also improve.  
I have argued that economists often explain using multiple models, and that the diversity of 
models could be considered as a means to better explanations in economics.  I would like to 
conclude with two take-home messages. The first one is for philosophers of economics. 
Most philosophical accounts of models focus on the relation between a model and its target 
(Knuuttila, 2009). Philosophers of economics rarely take the multiplicity and diversity of 
economic models into account. Moreover, the link between models and explanation is an 
understudied subject. If Rodrik is right, and if my exposition of the several ways in which 
models can contribute to explanations is correct, then philosophers of economics ignore the 
diversity of economic models and their services to explanations at their peril. The second 
lesson is for economists. Although there are exceptions like Dani Rodrik, most economists 
take the philosophical questions concerning their models rather too lightly. Moreover, as 
Rodrik argues, “very little research is devoted to what might be called economic diagnostics: 
figuring out which among multiple plausible models actually applies in particular, real-world 
settings” (Rodrik, 2017, p. 141). This is interesting because, as the preceding discussion 
shows, models play many roles in economics, and there is no easy route from theoretical 
models to singular explanations. Although, the diversity of models in economics could be 
considered as a means to better explanations, the multiplicity and diversity of models could 
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also lead us to problems like an embarrassment of riches (Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni, 
2018). Obviously, economists need to reflect on how they use their models and make their 
diagnostic strategies explicit. Both practicing economists and students will benefit from such 
reflection. 
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